Media365
5 min readOct 3, 2026 03:07 PM IST
First published on: Oct 3, 2026 at 03:06 PM IST
As the US-Israel war against Iran enters its eighth month, there is little indication that a “durable” agreement is likely to be reached soon to end the war and revive US-Iran negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme. The war has reignited the Saudi-Houthi conflict, incurring additional risks to the East-West pipeline as well as to the maritime traffic through the Red Sea and across the strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. Israel continues to be militarily engaged in four theatres — Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon and Syria, while perceived threats from Iran and its allies based in Iraq and Yemen have not diminished. On September 30, an attempt by an Arab co-pilot to allegedly crash a Flydubai flight FZ1073, while en route from Dubai to Tel Aviv, has raised the risk to aviation security in the region manyfold. A few days earlier, the UK police arrested five British nationals on suspicion of planning attacks on the RAF Fairford base, which is being used by US bombers deployed for war on Iran. Both incidents are still under investigation. However, Iran hawks within the region and in the West tend to believe that incidents must be linked to Iran.
Against this background, the US has chosen to withdraw all its troops from Iraq on September 30. The drawdown was in line with a bilateral agreement with the Iraqi government, though the condition of bringing all Iran-aligned armed groups under its control has not been met. This has raised serious concerns in the region about further deepening of Iranian influence in Iraq. Interestingly, the US has recently exempted select civilian Iranian fliers, allowing them to land in Iraq. It is pertinent to recall that the US handed over its last base in Syria to the interim government in April, even though Syria continues to be highly unstable. While the Trump administration does not seem inclined to militarily disengage with Iran, what do withdrawals from Iraq and Syria suggest about US policy for the region, including retaining its capacity to ward off global threats rooted in the geopolitics of the region?
The war on Iran seems to have pushed the US to reassess its footprint in the region for three reasons: Damage to bases, serious depletion of its munitions, and high casualties among US forces. Over 16 US bases in the region are reported to have suffered serious damage. US think tanks have documented an alarming depletion of munitions and long waiting times before most of it can be replenished to pre-war levels. This makes it harder for the US to adequately protect its bases and forces in the region. As of September 15, US documents have recorded 18 fatalities and injuries to 824 military personnel. The army seems to have borne the heaviest burden, reporting over 11 fatalities and 589 injuries as per data available till mid-August.
Moreover, inputs through the war kept flagging “successful” hacking of personal information of US forces based in the Gulf, including information about their families, home addresses, daily routine, etc. One such group, the Handala Hack Team, even released such information early on. Thus, force protection at the bases has become a crucial issue for the US, which explains the withdrawal from bases in Iraq and Syria. For the same reason, it is unlikely that the US may use existing bases in support of allies in other active conflicts such as Saudi-Houthi, Israel-Lebanon and Israel-Syria.
The US CENTCOM has categorically stated that “Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve remains operational and is now headquartered in Jordan as US forces continue the counter-ISIS mission in Syria alongside Coalition partners and the Syrian government.” This position is in line with the US’s current counter-terrorism strategy of working with partners rather than occupying bases in areas where force protection is a serious challenge.
The US is in the process of deploying a third aircraft-carrier strike group to the region, adding about 7,000 sailors and 2,000 Marines. The strengthening of seaborne resources seems to suggest that the US has perhaps reprioritised securing the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in the theatre over providing physical protection to allies. Having perhaps understood it well, the region, battling for a durable security architecture, is busy creating competing alliances/partnerships, including Israel-UAE, the Mecca alliance, and the Saudi-Pakistan Defence Pact. Many GCC countries are exploring ways to bring Iran into a broader security architecture to ensure stability, security, and prosperity of the region. Given the US focus on Iran’s nuclear programme and SLOCs as well as Israel-Iran hostilities, such efforts may face serious obstacles.
The two upcoming events — the Israeli elections and the US midterm elections — could produce political outcomes that may be unfavourable for the region. However, it is beyond doubt that the US-Israel war on Iran has resulted in multiple unintended consequences that the region and global community will have to cope with for years.
Gupta, a security analyst and former director general of police, is the author of Glocal Terror in South Asia, Tracing the Roots in Geopolitics and the Tragedy of Afghanistan
