Does Air India need more widebodies? The answer is a resounding yes

Air India wants more widebodies, and its new chief executive said so plainly. Speaking at the Aviation India Summit in New Delhi on November 3, 2026, Tewolde Gebremariam said: “We want to increase our order of widebody aircraft.” Gebremariam, who turned around Ethiopian Airlines in the past, argued that demand is not the constraint.

The airline has cut frequencies to Europe, Chicago, San Francisco and Washington because of current problems, and he said aircraft would return to those routes as soon as those problems ease, because the Indian diaspora wants Air India.

Gebremariam, who took over the corner office in August, just over a year after the deadly crash of AI 171 at Ahmedabad. That incident and the record losses by Air India forced equity partner Singapore Airlines to issue commentary on renewed focus as well as commitment to the investment.

Earlier this year, N. Chandrashekharan, chairman of Tata Sons (parent company of Air India) as well as the airline, had said it would take longer to turnaround Air India than what was earlier envisioned as part of the Vihaan.AI plan, which envisaged five years to turn the corner. Air India has 61 widebody aircraft in its fleet, only ten of which are factory fresh, six A350s which were destined for Aeroflot but became available after sanctions on Russia and four 787-9 Dreamliners. Air India’s current order for widebody aircraft included only 80 aircraft, and with ten delivered the backlog comprises 19 A350-900, 25 A350-1000, 16 787-9s and ten B777X .

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Supply chain shortages and delays in seat certifications, among other reasons, have meant that Air India’s A350-1000 is not ready for commercial induction, while the 777X programme has been delayed for years. Air India, having returned the B777-200LRs as per the original induction plan of the newer widebodies, faces more challenges than ever with the added time needed due to airspace closures.

When the skies re-open

Since the end of April last year, Pakistani airspace has been closed to Indian carriers. The long detour became longer after the West Asia war started. Nothing in geopolitics is permanent. Even the Berlin Wall fell. As and when things improve in West Asia and Pakistani airspace reopens, the one-stop which Air India currently has to North America will become non-stop, and the economics will favour the restart of many other services like those to Chicago and Washington.

The additional services to Southeast Asia will see a need to add flights to points in Europe and also see an addition to Australia, where the capacity has not grown for a very long time. When the geopolitical tensions subside, Air India’s challenge will move from “Where can we fly profitably?” to “How soon and where can we fly? ”.

The aircraft math does not see a one to one allocation for a route with a daily flight to North America requiring an average of over 1.5 aircraft to operate, which is rotated across the network to balance utilisation and count of landings. Clearly, getting back the network it once had in North America is not possible with the current fleet because the airline has also expanded elsewhere, like Japan and the Philippines.

Not just Delhi

Air India would, over a period of time, want to have a multi-hub strategy like Lufthansa, with Mumbai emerging as the natural choice for the second hub. Mumbai was the primary hub for Air India until 2008-9, when the hub and leadership in airports shifted from Mumbai to Delhi. Timed with the entry of Dreamliners, Air India set up a functional hub in Delhi connecting the East and the West. Equity partner Singapore Airlines has time and again hinted that its investments in Air India are to have multiple hubs beyond Singapore.

The addition of flights from Mumbai to destinations already flown by Air India from Delhi helps reduce costs, increase options and be present with larger dominance in a market. Every hub needs its own share of widebody aircraft, and the current clearly looks insufficient to operate a multi-hub strategy.

Indeed, getting back the Delhi flights and adding flights from Mumbai alone would need an additional 20-30 aircraft, and when expansion is budgeted, a lot more. The B777-300ERs in the fleet currently are anywhere between 13 and 19 years old and are older-generation aircraft. A delayed refurbishment, if it happens, will keep them going for another handful of years but is clearly not sufficient for the growth that the airline expects, especially due to the costs involved. At some point in time, these aircraft will be up for replacement from the current set of orders, which means that not all ordered aircraft will see incremental route additions.

What is holding back the order then?

Signing an order is easy on paper, but paying for it is not. The cost starts years before the first aircraft arrives, through pre-delivery payments (PDPs). Air India’s record losses would put pressure on any more outgo, especially with pressure from promoters for profitability. For widebodies with long lead times, that cash is committed well ahead of any revenue. When deliveries slip, as they have for both the A350-1000 and the 777X, the money stays locked up longer, and if the airline borrows to fund PDPs, interest runs on it the whole time. In times when it has to fund the losses, every rupee spent on PDP is a rupee kept away from funding the current losses.

The airline could focus on having operating profits rather than looking at the company being profitable, which could be a long time away. The first goal could be to ensure that it does not pay from its own pocket to take passengers from point A to B. The costs above the operating costs are a mix of legacy issues, PDPs and borrowings, which will change over a period of time but help the promoters know that the current network it flies is not funded by them but sustains on its own, and the additional funding is towards building the future.