The paradox of atmanirbharta in our defence strategy

However, atmanirbharta is on the wrong side of this well-known cost hierarchy in defence acquisitions: That the most cost-effective and timely method for acquiring a high-tech defence platform is to lease it for the duration that it is needed. Somewhat costlier is to buy the platform over the counter. Costlier than that is buying manufacturing technology and setting up a factory to build the equipment in-country. Paradoxically, atmanirbharta, which involves designing, developing, testing and manufacturing the platform, constitutes the most expensive acquisition method.

Ministry of Defence (MoD) figures indicate that successive Modi governments have raised indigenous defence and aerospace production fourfold from a relatively modest Rs 46,000 crore in 2014 to a high of Rs 1.78 trillion in the financial year 2025-26. During the same period, defence exports rose from Rs 600 crore in 2014 to Rs 38,434 crore last year. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has projected that defence exports would touch Rs 50,000 crore by 2028-29.

This rising trend is volubly backed by India’s strategic community, which argues that a rising power like India must be self-sufficient in designing and building its military arsenal. Only then would New Delhi enjoy “strategic autonomy” without being diverted by pressure from foreign governments and “original equipment manufacturers” (OEMs) of weaponry. Atmanirbhar Bharat also sits well with an increasingly nationalistic Indian public that wants to see Indian-made weaponry, firing Indian-made ammunition, knocking out tanks, warships, aircraft and bases of India’s foes.

There are, however, powerful counter-arguments to atmanirbharta. The first relates to the high cost of autarky. A familiar criticism is that ostensibly Indian weapons platforms such as the Tejas fighter, Indian Navy warships and many of the Army’s tactical missile systems are not really “Indian”, since as much as 40 per cent of their cost goes towards materials, components, subsystems and systems sourced from overseas.

There is a good reason for sourcing them from abroad: Developing every element of a weapon platform raises its cost unacceptably. Even the world’s most sophisticated defence economies and the premier weapon-building OEMs do not aspire for complete self-sufficiency. Instead, they retain control of key technologies in the weapons platform, while obtaining other systems and sub-systems from companies or countries that have already established technological supremacy in those fields. For example, 50-55 per cent of the world’s combat aircraft use ejection seats designed and built by the British firm Martin-Baker. Developers of new fighter aircraft seldom waste time and money designing an ejection seat. Even the most sophisticated aircraft, including Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II and China’s F-7 Guizhou, went straight to Martin-Baker.

That said, there are systems and technologies in every weapon platform that are indeed essential for atmanirbharta, and which must be identified as such from the start of its development. The Tejas fighter’s combat edge was manoeuvrability, inherent in its unstable design. That required a sophisticated “digital flight control computer” controlled by quadruplex fly-by-wire flight control software. This was developed for the Tejas Mark 1 and is now being modified into an even more sophisticated flight control system that will be the brain of the Tejas Mark 2 and the futuristic Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft. In developing this software, India has taken on, and won, the central challenge of designing and developing its own fighter aircraft.

For achieving real and financially viable atmanirbharta, the most important skill is going to be project management — finding the technological resources and managerial skill that will decide what systems and technologies are needed, where we will obtain them from, what we need to achieve through development and when it is time to close down a project.

Buying foreign defence equipment does provide the supplier with leverage over the buyer. However, embargoes and cut-offs can be deterred by taking on a significant role in the international supply chain. With OEMs relying heavily on components manufactured by hundreds of sub-contractors worldwide, that creates a mutual vulnerability that deters hostile action. Finally, there remains the uncomfortable question of whether producing a sophisticated defence kit is enough for a middle power like India when it remains dependent on overseas markets for critical commodities such as oil.

The writer is a retired Army officer and journalist